

度研究



2021 2 19



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| 16 |
| 23 |
| 23 |
| 27 |
| 30 |
| 32 |
| 33 |
| 34 |
| 34 |

SCP



2021 2 7

2020 11 10

1

2019

Facebook

2020 10

450

Investigation of Competition In Digital Markets



¹ European Commission Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Amazon for the use of non-public independent seller data and opens second investigation into its e-commerce business practices 10 November 2020.

Rain Design



Werden

 $^{^2\,}$ Herbert J. Hovenkamp $\,$ Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law, 2020.

| 1: 201 | .5 | FANG | | | 50 | | 1 | |
|------------|----|-------|----|------|-------------------------|------|----------------|--|
| | | | | | | | | |
| 2015 | 9 | 10375 | | | Google, Intel and Adobe | | | |
| 2016 | 12 | 200 | | | | | | |
| 2020 | 11 | 11300 | 30 | 2016 | Apple iPhone | Inc. | 1.13 iPhone | |
| 2015 | 12 | 31800 | | | | | | |



(CNIL)

GDP

1890 2000

1950

SCP

Investigation of Competition In Digital Markets

1911 1984 ATT

2000

Windows

1970

SCP

1982

2001

2002

Windows

Werden 2019



²⁰¹²

⁵ Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole (2001) "Platform Competition in Two Sided Markets," Working Paper, November 26, 2001.

1

Facebook

1890

2:

Top10

Bloomberg,

2021 2 17

1897

White

White rule of reason

7

White



2 VS

¹⁸⁹⁶ White the words "restraint of trade" embrace only contracts which unreasonably restrain trade, and, therefore, that reasonable contracts, although they, in some measure, "restrain trade," are not within the meaning of the words.

¹⁹¹¹ The Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, should be construed in the light of reason; and, as so construed, it prohibits all contracts and combination which amount to an unreasonable or undue restraint of trade in interstate commerce.it becomes obvious that the criteria to be resorted to in any given case for the purpose of ascertaining whether violations of the section have been committed is the rule of reason.

Coase R H, The nature of the firm, *Economica*, 1937, 4(16): 386-405.
 Coase R H, The nature of the firm, *Economica*, 1937, 4(16): 386-405.

Uber




¹² Avi Goldfarb, Catherine Tucker, Digital Economics, NBER Working Paper 23684, 2017 July.

2014

3Q

13



13

 $^{^{14}\,}$ OECD, Rethinking Antitrust Tools for Multi-Sided Platforms, 2018. $^{15}\,$ 2020 $\,$ 12 $\,$ 9

 $^{^{16}\,}$ Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole (2001) "Platform Competition in Two Sided Markets," Working Paper, November 26, 2001.

2018

17

18



App

App

Only other two-sided platforms can compete

¹⁷

²⁰¹⁸ And the fact that two-sided platforms charge one side a price that is below or above cost reflects differences in the two sides

power or anticompetitive pricing Thus, courts must include both sides of the plat-form merchants and cardholders when defining theoredit-card market.

18 2018

with a two-sided platform for transactions

QQ 19

QQ QQ

> 2 SSNIP

HMT hypothetical monopolist test

SSNIP Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price 5-10%



0

SSNIP SSNIP 0 0 5-10% 3Q

SSNIP

SSNDQ Small but Significant


21

Non-transitory Decrease in Quality

²² OECD 2018

SSNIP

SSNDQ²³



CR4 CR8

SCD

Turner

26

21

SSNDQ

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<sup>22</sup>
<sup>23</sup> OECD, Rethinking Antitrust Tools for Multi-Sided Platforms, 2018.

<sup>24</sup>
<sup>25</sup>

- /
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< > 17 2

Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, *Harvard Law Review*, Apr., 1969, Vol. 82. I believe there is sound legal ground for interpreting section 2 of the Sherman Act to apply to monopoly power that has been persistently maintained over a substantial period of time, except where based solely on economies of scale or where it arose out of and still depends upon the same unexpired patents.



28

29

²⁷ Oliver E. Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure Considerations, *Harvard* Law Review , Jun., 1972, Vol. 85. government intervention to upset this condition seems reasonable, provided only that (i) the dominant firm's market position can be judged to be relatively secure and hence unlikely to be undone by the operation of unassisted market processes, and (2) an efficacious remedy can be devised.

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/07/business/dealbook/elon-musk-warren-buffett-candy.html https://finance.yahoo.com/news/heres-warren-buffett-thinks-tesla-195520766.html

| 2034 1884 | 80 | 64 |
|--------------|------|--------------|
| | 2034 | 25% 29200 |
| | 2034 | 2920 |



31 https://medium.com/@mktgwithmeaning/that-steve-jobs-research-quote-should-rip-e8f3335ec66



*64

³² Tomova, L. et al.. Acute social isolation evokes midbrain craving responses similar to hunger. *Nature* Neuroscience,23 November, 2020.

³³ Avi Goldfarb, Catherine Tucker, Digital Economics, NBER Working Paper No. 23684, August 2017. On the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog."

3: 500 / 4: 500 /

20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Bloomberg
2015-2019
...
creative destruction
35

White 1910 36

1950-1970 30 80% 1960 90% 1979

35 2009

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit 1910 Loeb vs Kodak

District Court, W. D. New York 1915 United States vs Kodak

38



Berkey Photo vs Kodak


titan in its field

Herbert J. Hovenkamp Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law, 2020.
Ahmed Alibage, Charles Weber, Nokia Phones: From a Total Success to a Total Fiasco, 2018 Portland International Conference on Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET).

500 5:

Bloomberg

2020 12 18



R&D/GDP 1957 2014 2% 2% 2% 57

70%



| 0. | 2018 | R&D |
|----|-------|------|
| Α. | ///// | KAII |

| 2 | 2018年(百万) | | 年(百万) 基础研究 | | 应用研究 | | 开发 | | 总计 | | |
|-----|-----------|-------|------------|---------|-------------|--------------|------|---------------------|---|-------------|--------------|
| | | | Basic Rese | earch | Appli | ied Research | Deve | elopment | | | |
| | 部门 | | 美元 | 比重 | 美元 | 比重 | 美元 | 比重 | 美元 | 比重 | 重 |
| | 联邦政府 | | 40.4 | 41.8 | 39.5 | 34.3 | 47.4 | 12.9 | 127.3 | 21. | 9 |
| | 情情*** | -, T. | <u></u> | | <u>1</u> 1^ | | 2.0 | _{~ %.} 야구. | <u> جي </u> | —. <u> </u> | - |
| 4.3 | 313.9 | 85.2 | 404.2 | 69.7 | | 企业 | | 28 | 29 | 62.4 | 54 |
| .9 | 2.3 | 0.6 | 21.1 | 3.6 | | 高校 | | 13.1 | 13.6 | 5.7 | 4 |
| .1 | 4.3 | 1.2 | 22.7_ | 3.9 | _ | 其他非营利组织 | | 12.5 | 13 | 5.8 | 5 |
| 00 | 368.5 | 100 | 580 | 100 | | 总计 | | 96.5 | 100 | 115 | 1 |

CRS analysis of National Science Foundation




42



R&D/

⁴² The Committee for the Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, Economic Growth, Technological Change, and Climate Change, October 8, 2018.

9:



Bloomberg



⁴³ Bain, J. S. Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration: American Manufacturing, 1936–1940. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1951. Mann, H. M. Seller Concentration, Barriers to Entry, and Rates of Return in Thirty Industries, 1950-1960. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1966.

13

2010



IBM

44

2018

And the fact that two-sided platforms charge

power or anticompetitive pricing Thus, courts must include both sides of the plat-form merchants and

cardholders when defining thecredit-card market.

45 https://truthonthemarket.com/2020/02/03/the-ghosts-of-antitrust-past-part-2-ibm/. The case lasted almost thirteen years, ending on January 8, 1982 when Assistant Attorney General William Baxter declared the case to



IBM

IBM

1969

IBM IBM

47

IBM 1981 Intel

Microsoft 32 IBM





leverage effect

3Q

QQ





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